Social Media and the Middle East

Introduction

On December 17, 2010 a policewoman in Tunisia confiscated 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi’s unlicensed produce cart, which represented Bouazizi’s only livelihood. Bouazizi, breadwinner for a family of eight, had been selling fruits and vegetables for seven years and this was not the first time he had been bothered by police. Allegedly Bouazizi tried to pay the equivalent of a $7 fine, but the policewoman “slapped the scrawny young man, spat in his face and insulted his dead father” (Abouzied). Disgraced, he tried to file a complaint with government officials but they refused to see him. Not even an hour after authorities commandeered his wheelbarrow full of produce, Bouazizi returned to the provincial headquarters where he had tried to complain. Drenched in fuel, he set himself on fire outside the headquarters and died several weeks later. His death and mistreatment ignited protests inside his hometown and they quickly spread to other cities including the capital of Tunisia, Tunis. The protests sometimes turned into violent riots and the Tunisian government responded accordingly. State security forces arrested demonstrators and the Internet was shutdown (Noor). President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali tried to quell the citizens’ aggressive protests by offering to create 300,000 jobs, but the demonstrations continued. They concluded on January 14, 2011, a month and a half after Bouazizi’s self-immolation the president and his family fled to Saudi Arabia, bringing an end to the 23-year-old regime. Bouazizi’s death and the protests that followed inspired Arabs in several other countries to organize, standup for their rights, and rebel against their respective governments (Noor).

The case of the Tunisian revolution, the first of several revolutions in the Middle East, is an interesting one precisely because the Ben Ali regime was so repressive. How did news of the protests and demonstrations spread in a country that in 2010-ranked 164^th out of 178 in Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders)? Certainly the state owned media was not going to cover the events in a favorable light. A report on the Human Rights Watch 2010 World Report said,

“Press freedom is abridged in Tunisia and was increased during and after the national elections in October. None of the domestic print and broadcast media offer critical coverage of government policies, apart from a few low-circulation magazines. The government blocks access to some domestic and international political or human rights websites featuring critical coverage of Tunisia. The targeting of the press was particularly pronounced around the time of the presidential and legislative elections, which President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally party won by a landslide for a fifth consecutive term. The election itself was marred by repressive acts and tight controls” (Human Rights Watch 2010).

Moreover, it wasn’t just the media in Tunisia that had substantial restrictions. Tunisia was also known as one of the most political repressive places on the planet. How did opposition organize so swiftly and effectively in a country where the slightest hint of dissidence would be grounds for public corrections? Tunisian dissident lawyer and writer Mohamed Abbou was put behind bars for more than two years in 2005, not because he was leading an organization that would threaten the regime, but because, as he says,

“I broke a taboo by denouncing the scandals and by evoking corruption. That's when the regime decided to hit the interests of my family and to persecute my family. Then it threw me in jail, seeking to humiliate me” (Abbou 2007).

Abbou calls this a “policy of fear.” He says it has grown into a tradition and Ben-Ali made it an even more efficient tool against political opposition. After his release Abbou wrote that if one makes the decision to rebel against the regime, one must consider the possibility that one’s family and children would also pay a price. He wrote in 2007, the “policy of fear” has worked so well, “the majority of Tunisian citizens are terrified at the very idea of speaking about politics” (Abou 2007).

Social Media: Affecting a Revolution

Revolution 2.0

For most Americans websites like youtube.com and facebook.com are valued because they provide entertainment while providing another avenue to stay connected with friends, family, and interests. It is not related to ‘media’ in the traditional ‘news media’ sense, which is associated with news organizations and institutions like newspapers and television broadcasts. However, not to be confused, YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook are ‘news’ distributing platforms. The distribution process is just done in a much different fashion than newspapers and television. It is much more social, hence social media.

Social media is an effective tool in organizing and mobilizing a revolution on at least two grounds. First, instead of meeting in person or over the phone oppositional forces can organize demonstrations and invite people to take part. This can also be a problem because it wouldn’t take much effort for the government to obtain the dates and locations of protests and try to stop them before they start.

An example of this kind of organization around Facebook is commonly called the April 6 Movement in Egypt. Egypt, like Tunisia had significant limits to freedom of the press and political mobilization. In early 2006, two Egyptian youths got wind of a workers protest in the industrial town of Mahalla al-Kobra. Workers around Egypt had been periodically protesting high rates of inflation and unemployment for more than a year but their protests were never coordinated. One of the youths sent a text message to the other saying that Egyptians ought to show support for the workers. On March 23, 2006 they set up the “April 6 Strike” group on Facebook. By the next the day the group had more than a 1,000 members and eventually reached over 76,000 members. The members discussed what should be done, but the group never established a unified plan of action. Members claiming to be government security agents infiltrated the group and warned them against participation in the strike. On April 6, despite police and military vehicles blocking off streets and government security personnel seemingly everywhere, some of the members agreed to meet people at a Kentucky Fried Chicken in Tahir Square. One of the original two youths was arrested after she found the police surrounding the KFC (Shapiro 2009). While the April 6 strike wasn’t quite on the same level as a revolution there are some positives to take away from experiment. The sheer number of members who participated through Facebook demonstrated their unrest with the status quo. The April 6 Strike was successful in that it amplified the protest that was planned offline (Shapiro 2009).

Many see the current revolutions in the Arab world, as a result or outcome of the Internet and social media. Head of Marketing for the Middle East and North Africa at Google, and Egyptian native Wael Ghonim was held prisoner for 12 days in Egypt. A day after his release he shared his thoughts, in an interview with CNN on Febuary 7, 2011,

"If you want to free a society, just give them Internet access, because people are going to - you know, the young crowds are going to - are going to all go out and see and - and hear the unbiased media, see the truth about, you know, other nations and their own nation, and they're going to be able to communicate and collaborate together”(CNN).

Certainly, it can be argued that the Internet and social media acted as maybe the only platform available for participants in the revolution. In a relatively free society it is perhaps understandable to take things like freedom of expression and assembly for granted. For decades these things were merely an illusion in many Middle Eastern countries. What social media offered was an unconstrained voice.

The second benefit of using social media is its popularity worldwide. Although it may not be necessary, having the international community on your side whilst engaging in a revolution certainly can’t hurt. Tunisia is a good example for two reasons. First, this is where it all began. In the early days of the revolution there were few, if any international news organizations with a niche in the country. So there was very little, if any coverage of the first few days of the protest. Secondly, the Tunisian government was so restrictive on press freedom, if news stories were going to get out it wouldn’t be from any actual news organization. In fact, all state run media were ordered not to cover the protests (Miladi 2011). Spreading the word would most likely have to come from citizens using some form of social media.

The revolution was being televised but you had to be an active Facebook member to view it. Footage of the protests could be taken with cell phones and video cameras and uploaded to Facebook pages for anyone with Internet access to see. Sites like YouTube had been censored in 2008 after another wave of protests were suppressed (Raghavan). 22-year-old student Saifeddine Amre, who had previously spent six months behind bars for writing a story about Ben Ali’s wife, went to Sidi Bouzid, hometown of Mohamed Bouazizi and other cities to film the demonstrations. Amre said, “Facebook was the means of our revolution. We used it to apply pressure on the regime, to make sure the truth came out” (Raghavan).

New Tool, Old Revolution

In the Western world Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, along with other social media are being championed with being responsible for the current state of affairs in many Arab countries. A new generation of computer literate youth were said to be leading the charge against the autocrats. This begs the question, if not for social media would the revolutions in the Middle East have happened? Before answering this question, it is important to note that since this phenomenon is only a few months old, much of the research conducted is incomplete and much more should be done to determine the exact effects of social media. What we do know is in the early part of 2011 revolutions, protests, uprisings, reformations, and countless other words have been used to describe people’s unrest in many Middle Eastern countries. It is hard not to generalize this unrest across the several nations as rebellion against authoritarian governments, because that is what it seemed to be. What we do know is that a Tunisian man named Mohamed Bouazizi can be credited with sparking the first wave of protests in the small North African country.

Some commentators believe that the role social media played is much less significant than other factors. Some of their main points are social media in the end can only do so much. Politics, or the struggle for power occurs outside the virtual arena. Talking about a revolution online and actually conducting one are two very different things. The uprisings were more likely the result of decades of oppression. Popular movements have occurred for centuries, long before the Internet was around.

Will Heaven is a writer for the Daily Telegraph, a popular British newspaper. In late March, he wrote an article that argued social media played a much smaller role in the uprisings than originally thought. He begins by illustrating how the Google executive mentioned earlier, Wael Ghonim, began his “Revolution 2.0.” Ghonim first got involved in the Egyptian revolution long before most people in America, including our government, had any idea that a revolution was brewing. Ghonim, using the alias “ElShaheed” to protect his identity created the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Said” in response to the brutal murder of 28-year-old Egyptian businessman, Khaled Said, in June 2010. Said had come across footage of several Egyptian police officers dividing up drugs and seized cash. He bravely posted the videos online. Later two of the same policeman saw Said walking outside an Internet café. “Witnesses say his head was smashed against a marble table repeatedly, before he was dragged outside and kicked to death” (Heaven 2011). The police report said that Said had died after swallowing a bag of marijuana. But morgue photos acquired by Said’s family showed a much more violent story. Again, Said’s cousins chose to publish the photos online. These photos reached Ghonim who republished them on his Facebook page. At the end of January 2011 his page had more than 350,000 followers worldwide. Ghonim suggested to all of his ‘followers’ that they unite in protest against the Mubarak regime January 25 (Heaven 2011).

“The turnout on January 25 set a historic precedent. Did Wael Ghonim’s six-month old Facebook page play a part in this? Almost certainly yes. But other factors dwarf its significance hugely, not least that Tunisia had overthrown a dictator just nine days earlier. The protests – dare one say it – would probably have occurred without the help of Facebook or other social networks like Twitter. January 25 is a national holiday in Egypt” (Heaven 2011)l

Heaven is strongly critical of those who believe that the Internet is responsible for the events in the Arab world. He goes on to say.

“The Western media has focused intently on the role of Western technology, but less so on the fact that active street protests, a strikingly familiar vehicle for revolution, brought down dictators. The chaotic reality of the Arab street protests – at one point, bizarrely, there was a camel charge in Cairo – has been repackaged for a Western audience. No doubt the 30 million Facebook users in the UK, and the tens of millions who enjoyed The Social Network last year, welcomed that” (Heavnen 2011)

I will not argue with Heaven’s assertion that Westerner’s like to feel good about themselves because they think they are somehow making a difference by “liking” a protest page in Egypt on Facebook. However, his argument possibly underestimates the key role social media played in giving Egyptian’s a platform to share information freely. The very fact that Khaled Said and his family chose to post their videos and photos online instead of handing them over to local authorities or news organizations shows a kind of faith in the Internet’s ability to share information.

Determining the Past and Future Implications

To answer to whether or not social media is responsible for the current uprisings in the Middle East, a definition of “responsible” must be clear. If responsible means acting as a catalyst for the uprisings then yes, social media can take some responsibility. If responsible means social media was the determining factor in whether or not the uprisings took place then no, the impact of social media on the popular uprising has yet to be fully determined.

Evgeny Morozov, author of The Net Delusion argues,

“These digital tools are simply, well, tools, and social change continues to involve many painstaking, longer-term efforts to engage with political institutions and reform movements” (Morozov 2011).

His point is well taken. The root causes of revolution, poverty, unemployment, corruption, and oppression deserve far more attention than the tools protestors used to organize. However, the causes of revolution are old, the way revolutions are carried out is new. The Internet is changing the way revolutions are conducted. Never before could citizens instantly communicate with each other across such a wide space. Social media is a worldwide revolution. The technology gap between the rich and poor countries provides a large barrier to that revolution. Would the international community have waited so long to act in Rwanda if there were video clips of the horrors that went on floating around on the web? The truth is that no matter how repressed a people are, as long as they have Internet, they can connect with each other and the rest of the world.

Is it possible that the uprisings would have been carried out without the Internet’s help? Yes, but that is not what I am arguing. Social media clearly helped organize, mobilize, and energize the activists behind the uprisings. But the Internet also had an unintended effect on the revolutions, one that perhaps tipped the scales more than anything else. More than just a powerful communication tool, Egyptians used the Internet in the same ways that Americans do. So when the Mubarak regime shut the Internet down because he didn’t want opposition organizing on the web, he sparked anger in those who were not involved in the protests initially.

Ethan Zuckerman a research fellow at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society calls this phenomenon the “cute-cat theory of digital activism.” He explains

“Web sites or proxy servers created specifically for activists are easy for a government to shut down, Zuckerman says, but around the world, dissidents thrive on sites, like Facebook, that are used primarily for more mundane purposes (like exchanging pictures of cute cats). Authoritarian regimes can’t block political Facebook groups without blocking all the “American Idol” fans and cat lovers as well. “The government can’t simply shut down Facebook, because doing so would alert a large group of people who they can’t afford to radicalize” (Shapiro, 2009.)

After the smoke clears and the dust settles, the lasting legacy of social media on the uprisings in the Middle East may depend on what happens next. If authoritarian regimes replace authoritarian regimes nothings has been accomplished. Maybe one issue with organizing online is that online media creates online leaders. Organizing politically is much different than organizing in an Internet setting. Speculating on what will happen in the future is just that, speculation. Who knows what the outcomes of this will be 5-10 years down the line? What we know is that social media certainly are powerful communication and organization tools. As the technology spreads, more and more people will be able to communicate their thoughts to the rest of the world.

Works Cited

-Abbou, Mohammed. "Twenty Years of Suffering." Http://www.mafhoum.com/press10/312S28.htm. 12 Dec. 2007. Web.

-Abouzied, Rania. "Tunisia: How Mohammed Bouazizi Sparked a Revolution - TIME." Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com. 21 Jan. 2011. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-CNN.com - Transcripts." CNN.com - Breaking News, U.S., World, Weather, Entertainment & Video News. 9 Feb. 2011. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-Heaven, Will. "Egypt and Facebook: Time to Update Its Status." NATO - Homepage. 24 Mar. 2011. Web. Apr. 2011. .

-Human Rights Watch. "Tunisia: Worsening Repression of Human Rights Defenders, Journalists | Human Rights Watch." Home | Human Rights Watch. 21 Jan. 2010. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-Miladi, Noureddine. "Tunisia: A Media Led Revolution? - Opinion - Al Jazeera English." AJE - Al Jazeera English. 17 Jan. 2011. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-Noor, Naseema. "Tunisia: The Revolution That Started It All." International Affairs Review. 31 Jan. 2011. Web. .

-Raghavan, Sudarsan. "A Lost Generation of Young People of Tunisia Discuss Grievances That Led to Their Revolution." The Washington Post: National, World & D.C. Area News and Headlines - Washingtonpost.com. 20 Jan. 2011. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-Reporters Without Borders. "Press Freedom Index 2010." Reporters Without Borders. Web. 08 Apr. 2011. .

-Shapiro, Samantha M. "Revolution, Facebook-Style - Can Social Networking Turn Young Egyptians Into a Force for Democratic Change? - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. 22 Jan. 2011. Web. Apr. 2011. .